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THOMAS I. EMERSON: A
PIONEER FOR WOMEN'S
EQUALITY
Ann E. Freedman * and Sylvia A. Law **
THOMAS I. EMERSON took women's aspirations for equality
under law seriously at a time, in the late 1960's, when very few
Americans did so. Robert Bork, by contrast, rejected the notion
that the Constitution protects women's equality and liberty at a
time, in the late 1980's, when those ideas had become deeply em-
bedded in our culture and law. This essay first describes some of
Emerson's major contributions to this sea change in our under-
standing of gender and the Constitution. We then speculate briefly
on the impact of two important, but contradictory events upon the
development of constitutional rights of sexual equality: the defeat
of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA or the Amendment) and the
rejection of Robert Bork as Supreme Court Justice.
I. EMERSON'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE.
For two decades Thomas I. Emerson has applied his probing
intellect and deep understanding of American constitutional law to
extend liberty and equality to women. His support of women's
struggles has been creative, energetic and eclectic.
As at other academic institutions, the late 1960's and early
1970's were a time of considerable turmoil at the Yale Law School,
and Professor Thomas I. Emerson occupied an unusual position.
Emerson, a graduate of the school and looking every bit the part of
a traditional New England law professor, was at the height of a
career marked by scholarly and professional leadership on most is-
sues being raised by the students: the protection of free speech, the
struggle against racism, the struggle for reproductive rights, and the
* Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Camden; B.A., Rad-
cliffe College (1968); J.D., Yale University (1971).
** Director of the Arthur Garfield Hays Civil Liberty Program and Professor of Law,
New York University; B.A., Antioch College (1964); J.D., New York University (1968). I
would like to thank NYU's Filomon D. Greenberg Research Program for supporting my
work on this article, and Helen Hershkoff for perceptive comments.
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importance of lawyering in the context of political movements
(rather than in isolation). When leaders of the second wave of the
women's movement needed constitutional experts to testify in favor
of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment, it was natural for them
to turn to him as someone with a brilliant mind, scholarly creden-
tials, political savvy, a history of activism and a commitment to
equality.1 And so in September of 1970, Tom Emerson testified in
favor of the Amendment before the House Judiciary Committee.2
Tom, with characteristic sensitivity, recognized that there were
problems with having the theory of an amendment that would pro-
mote women's rights elucidated by a male law professor, and so he
invited some of his feminist activist students3 to help him prepare
his testimony. When Tom was asked by the Editor-In-Chief of the
Yale Law Journal to develop a theory of the Amendment at greater
length, he again asked some of the students to work with him. In
the summer of 1971, Tom and three of his students published a law
review article on the proposed Equal Rights Amendment4 that was
to play a major part in congressional debates on the ERA, and to be
read across the country during the course of the state ratification
debates.5
At the time the article was written, the Supreme Court had just
granted certiorari on a series of cases that were to begin the change
in equal protection law concerning gender,6 but the full extent of
1. Many others also made major contributions to this effort. See Brown, Emerson,
Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for
Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, nn.3-5 (1971) [hereinafter Brown, et all.
2. Hearings on S.J. Res. 61 and S.J. Res. 231 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
91st Cong., 2d Sess., 298-312 (1970) [hereinafter ERA Hearings]. See also Equal Rights for
Women: A Symposium on the Proposed Constitutional Amendment, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 215 (1971) (in which four of the law professors who testified before the Senate Judici-
ary Committee expanded somewhat on their testimony).
3. These students included Barbara Brown, Gail Falk, Ann Freedman, and Ann Hill,
all Yale Law School class of 1971, which was the first class at the law school to include more
than twelve women students.
4. Brown, et al, supra note 1, at 871. It is characteristic of Tom that he insisted his
student co-authors be given co-equal credit with him and that the authors be listed alphabeti-
cally, instead of following the tradition by which professors are listed first, and students after,
if at all. This may have been the first time in the history of the journal that student authors'
work appeared in the articles section in the front of the magazine.
5. Senator Sam Ervin's attacks on the ERA prominently featured short quotations
from the article, and these formed the basis of much anti-ERA propaganda, spreading Emer-
son's name, if not his intended message, more broadly. Rhode, Equal Rights in Retrospect, I
L. & INEQUALITY 21 n.77 (1983) [hereinafter Rhode].
6. Certiorari had recently been granted in Alexander v. Louisiana, 401 U.S. 936 (1971);
Reed v. Reed, 401 U.S. 934 (1971); and Stanley v. Illinois, 401 U.S. 1020 (1971). See Brown,
et al, supra note I.
[Vol. 38:539
WOMEN'S EQUALITY
the changes the Court would make in the next decade were not gen-
erally anticipated.7 Moreover, because of the Supreme Court's
lengthy history of insensitivity toward sexual equality issues8 and
the ambivalence about a strong equality principle reflected in previ-
ous legislative debates about the proposed Amendment,9 supporters
of the Amendment were concerned that the ERA itself might be
deprived of its power either by weakening legislative amendments
or by subsequent judicial interpretation. For example, the Amend-
ment might be interpreted not to apply to pregnancy-based classifi-
cations, or to exempt laws that enacted sexual classifications in the
guise of protecting or benefitting women.10
Tom, drawing on his experience in developing a comprehensive
theory of the first amendment and his experience as a litigator of
privacy and reproductive rights, recognized the need to develop a
coherent theoretical framework for the Equal Rights Amendment.
This theory, based on the conceptions of the Amendment's meaning
that proponents had already developed, could explain the applica-
tion of that framework to various concrete problems as a way to
give life to its abstractions. Tom and his co-authors hoped that
such an effort might serve both to help persuade Congress, the state
legislatures and the American people of the need for the ERA, and
later to shape the interpretive process in the legislatures and the
courts. Thus, Tom brought to the struggle not only the courage
and vision to work for the ERA's passage on an equal basis with
women and within the women's movement rather than as an iso-
lated academic, but also his deep understanding of the enterprise of
constitutional law, and of the process of constitutional change. The
resulting article intentionally used a calm academic tone and delib-
erative approach to the issues to forestall the idea that sexual equal-
ity was a radical and dangerous idea. At the same time, it
attempted to marshall enough concrete evidence of the harms of sex
discrimination and the advantages of change, to make a strong case
7. See, eg., Brown et al, supra note 1, at 881.
8. The Supreme Court's record on women's rights is reviewed id. at 875-79.
9. Id. at 886-88.
10. Some of these problems have dogged fourteenth amendment jurisprudence. See,
eg., Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (law giving female naval officers more
favorable rules concerning forced retirement upheld as compensation for women's inferior
opportunities for promotion); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (exclusion of preg-
nancy-related disabilities from state temporary disability insurance program does not violate
the fourteenth amendment); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (non-means tested property
tax exemption for widows but not widowers upheld as a remedy for employment discrimina-
tion against older women).
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for the need for the Amendment. It was thus an effort to unite legal
scholarship and political advocacy of social justice in the service of
women's rights.
While the 1971 Yale article on the ERA is probably Tom's most
important contribution to our developing understanding and reali-
zation of gender equality, it is not his only gift to that effort. In 1979
he wrote the introduction to Catherine MacKinnon's book, The
Sexual Harassment of Working Women,11 an important effort
which grappled with the problem at a time when the phenomenon
was only beginning to be recognized." Even though MacKinnon
and Emerson were developing divergent modes of conceptualizing
sexual equality, he lent his support and prestige to this then young
and less recognized colleague. Tom's introduction described MacK-
innon's theory of sexual equality in terms that are accessible to
readers who have difficulty understanding her sometimes dense
prose.
Most recently, in 1986, Tom Emerson joined in the highly con-
troversial debate of whether feminists should seek broader state
sanction against sexually explicit materials that subordinate or de-
grade women. Feminist legal scholars have been deeply divided on
this question. A person who wanted to continue to enjoy the re-
spect and affection of colleagues and friends who hold sharply, often
bitterly, divided views, might well choose to avoid speaking on these
issues. Yet, Tom Emerson rejected that easy course and offered an
eloquent, feminist defense of traditional first amendment values,
cast in a form that is deeply respectful of the concerns of those with
whom he disagreed. 3
Through these years Tom served as an indefatigable and invalu-
able advisor to scores of feminist students, legal scholars and activ-
ists. Each of us have attended meetings in which he was the only
man and twenty years the senior of everyone else in the room. For
many people, the august role of senior advisor to the women's legal
movement could engender arrogance. But Tom is unshakably mod-
11. C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARRASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION (1979).
12. The early case law, which represented a series of defeats for women charging their
employers with sexual harassment, is discussed and critiqued in MacKinnon's work id. at 57-
99. See also Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a Form of Employ-
ment Discrimination, 21 B.C.L. REV. 345, 362 n.86 (1980). The first victories in the federal
appellate courts were Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977) and Tomkins v.
PSE&G Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3rd Cir. 1977).
13. T. Emerson, Pornography and the First Amendment: A Reply to Professor MacKin-
non, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 130 (1984).
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est, able to hear and learn from others with much less knowledge
and experience, and willing to offer his insight in terms that are
powerfully cogent and, at the same time, invite disagreement.
II. THE DEFEAT OF THE ERA
The 1971 Yale Law Journal article failed to acheive its core pur-
pose of securing an amendment to the United States Constitution to
prohibit state sponsored discrimination on the basis of sex. On June
30, 1982, the deadline for ratifying the Equal Rights Amendment
passed with only thirty-five of the required thirty-eight states having
ratified. Many people have sought to understand why the ERA
failed. In this brief tribute, we will present some thoughts on this
question and identify areas of agreement and disagreement between
our account and those of others.14 More particularly, we will argue
that, despite the defeat of the ERA, Tom Emerson's Yale article
and the campaign of which it was a part had an important impact in
promoting acceptance of sexual equality both in Supreme Court
14. There are four major accounts to which we will refer. The first, M.F. BERRY, WHY
ERA FAILED, POLITICS, WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND THE AMENDING PROCESS OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION (1986) [hereinafter BERRY], written by a professor of history at Howard University
who is a former Commissioner of the United States Civil Rights Commission, analyzes why
the ERA failed in the context of prior efforts to amend the constitution and concludes that
the causes of the ERA's defeat included the inherent difficulties of the amendment process,
the need for widespread societal support for the substantive changes the Amendment would
bring (which often requires many years to obtain, and which must be communicated effec-
tively to legislators in all the states and nationally) and the proponents' failure to prepare
early on for a series of discrete regional battles about the Amendment. The second, J. MAN-
SBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA (1986) [hereinafter MANSBRIDGE], by a professor of
political science and sociology at Northwestern University who was herself active in the un-
successful ERA ratification campaign in Illinois, argues that the Amendment was defeated
largely because the American public did not want any significant change in gender roles in
the society. According to Mansbridge, the Amendment would not in fact have brought about
sweeping changes in gender roles in the near future; however, proponents and opponents each
for their own reasons exaggerated the impact the Amendment would have, leading to its
defeat. MANSBRIDGE, supra at 1-4. The third, Rhode, supra note 5, by a professor at Stan-
ford Law School, analyzes the Illinois ratification effort in some detail and concludes that
strategic errors of the proponents coupled with ambivalence of traditional women about the
advantages to them of gender equality led to the Amendment's defeat in that state. The
fourth, G. STEINER, CONSTITUTIONAL INEQUALITY, THE POLITICAL FORTUNES OF THE
EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT (1985) [hereinafter STEINER], by a senior fellow in the Gov-
ernmental Studies program of the Brookings Institution, rejects many commonly offered ex-
planations for the Amendment's defeat, and looks instead to factors that arose during the
ratification period, including Senator Sam Ervin's gain in stature as a result of the Watergate
Hearings, the increasing intensity of the abortion debate, and the Soviet invasion of Afghani-
stan, as well as the proponents' choice to resort to legislative shortcuts both in an effort to
obtain an extension of time to work for the remaining three states needed to obtain ratifica-
tion and, after the first ratification period expired, to pass the Amendment a second time
without crippling amendments to the original text.
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doctrine and in more general public attitudes and behavior. The
success of the program advocated in that article can be seen in
evolving constitutional doctrine under the fourteenth amendment,
in changing American public attitudes and behavior in relation to
gender roles, and, most recently, in the Senate's rejection of the
nomination of Robert Bork to be Associate Justice of the United
States Supreme Court.15 Women, as well as men who recognize
how gender roles constrain them, owe Tom Emerson a tremendous
debt of gratitude for his contribution in accomplishing these
changes. Indeed, the very success of the movement toward gender
equality under law, while far from complete, was paradoxically an
important factor leading to the defeat of the ERA.
When Congress proposed the ERA to the states in 1972, 30
states ratified it quickly, generally without controversy or extensive
debate. Five more states ratified between 1974 and 1977. Not one
state endorsed the Amendment between 1977 and 1982. During the
last five years, both proponents and opponents of the ERA mobil-
ized nationally and in unratified states to garner public and legisla-
tive support. The ERA campaign became a focal point for national
debates about the meaning and desirability of legal equality between
women and men.
Gender roles have a profound impact on every aspect of our
lives and culture and obviously many factors contribute to a polit-
ical process as complex as an effort to amend the Constitution to
prohibit state sponsored discrimination on the basis of sex. Since
the events of the ERA ratification campaign are still fresh, and be-
cause they aroused strong emotions in all those who participated, it
is unlikely that a definitive account is yet possible. Nonetheless, we
believe that analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the ERA
campaign is an important part of the regrouping of feminist forces
that is now taking place.
We are also concerned at this early stage that the process of self-
examination not prevent us from recognizing certain important
ways in which the ERA campaign has contributed to feminist social
change, nor blind us to the larger social forces that are at work in
the struggle for equality for women.
We believe that three of the most important causes of the ERA's
defeat were: 1) the extent to which ERA proponents were victims
of their own successes in eliminating the most egregious forms of
15. For a discussion on these and other efforts, see MANSBRIDGE, supra note 14, at 88-
91. For discussion of the Bork nomination, see infra notes 55-69 and accompanying text.
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sex discrimination from the law during the time that the ERA was
being debated; 2) the organizational and political failures of the pro-
ponents; and 3) the skill and good fortune of the ERA's opponents.
We shall discuss each in turn.
By the late 1970's the Supreme Court had interpreted the four-
teenth amendment's equal protection clause to strike down almost
all the explicitly gender-based laws and practices on which Con-
gress had focused when it passed the ERA in 1972.16 Thus when
the final states were asked to ratify the ERA, the abstract idea of
gender equality had, to a significant extent, been incorporated into
the Constitution and many sexist laws had been invalidated. In
pragmatic terms, the Court had dealt with the relatively easy issues
of sexual equality and the ERA would have an immediate concrete
impact only in those cases that were regarded by the Court, and the
public, as more controversial. Of course, these changes in four-
teenth amendment jurisprudence were due, in part, to the ERA
struggle which influenced both the legal community's and the gen-
eral public's understanding of sexual equality. 7 Nonetheless, in the
latter half of the ERA ratification campaign, the proponents had to
find a way to educate the public and the legislatures on the more
difficult issues, such as the military draft, and the need for legisla-
tive review of facially sex-neutral laws with a disparate impact on
women. This was not a task for which the campaign for congres-
sional ratification or the easy victories in the early years of the cam-
paign had prepared them.
Tactical and organizational failures of the proponents also con-
tributed significantly to the failure of ratification efforts. While
some analysts have placed great emphasis on weaknesses in the pub-
lic relations aspects of the campaign,18 and a general lack of polit-
ical sophistication on the part of proponents, 9 we are inclined to
16. BERRY, supra note 14, at 86-88; MANSBRIDGE, supra note 14, at 2, 46-7; STEINER,
supra note 14, at 38-42.
17. See Justice Brennan's discussion on this point in his opinion for the Supreme Court
in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687-88 (1973), BERRY, supra note 14, at 86.
18. Rhode, for example, offers a scathing attack on the ERA proponents, arguing that
proponents in Illinois were often overly technical, insensitive to the concerns and perspectives
of housewives, unable to outmaneuver clever (and often dishonest) opponents in debate or
simply extremist. Rhode, supra note 5, at 1, 3-4, 19-24, 43. See also MANSBRIDGE, supra
note 14, at 160-63, analyzing political errors made by ERA proponents in Illinois as a result
of their relative inexperience within and outside the legislature.
19. "On a practical level, the ERA failed because its most active proponents lacked
sufficient adeptness, cohesion, and leverage to counteract opposition strategies .... [There
was] a poverty of both social theory and practical politics within the feminist camp." Rhode,
supra note 5, at 3-4. See also MANSBRIDGE, supra note 14, at 159-62. Steiner, in contrast,
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think the most significant problem was the failure to mobilize for an
extended series of discrete regional battles over the Amendment un-
til late in the ratification process.2 ° Buoyed by a false sense of confi-
dence instilled by the easy victories in the first half of the ratification
campaign, proponents tended to underestimate the difficulties of
adapting their message to the very different political circumstances
and attitudes characteristic of the unratified states.2"
In our view, however, by far the most important factor in the
ERA's defeat was the political effectiveness and good fortune of the
anti-ratification forces. To understand this part of the story, it is
useful to begin with the origins and political context of the opposi-
tion. By the mid-1970's, opposition to the ERA was being mobil-
ized by new right leaders, of whom Phyllis Schlafly was the most
prominent.22 Ms. Schlafly perceived that anti-feminist and anti-
abortion sentiment provided a more productive set of issues around
which to organize than traditional anticommunism.23 Ms. Schlafly
began her political career in the Republican Party where she
focused on international issues and sought to advance a strong
anticommunist viewpoint. In 1964, she was instrumental in encour-
aging the Party to nominate Barry Goldwater for President.24
When Schlafly turned her attention to the ERA campaign, the time
was ripe for a coalition with the anti-abortion movement that arose
in response to the Supreme Court's 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade. 5
suggests that proponents had waged a relatively strong campaign. STEINER, supra note 14, at
42-45, 80.
20. BERRY, supra note 14, at 68-69.
21. See MANSBRIDGE, supra note 14, at 149-50 (for a discussion of attitudes characteris-
tic of legislators who voted against the ERA in Florida, North Carolina, Oklahoma and
Illinois); STEINER, supra note 14, at 54-55 and infra note 32 and accompanying text on the
difficulties of getting the later ratifications.
22. BERRY, supra note 14, at 66; MANSBRIDGE, supra note 14, at 110-115, 133-35.
23. See Rhode, supra note 5, at 12-13. But see id. at 13 (feminists also used ERA as an
organizational device). Rhode also notes that few grass roots activists on either side seemed
to be motivated by desires for public recognition or political goals unrelated to ratification.
Id. at 15. Mansbridge suggests that "[1]eaders of the old Radical Right, who had tradition-
ally focused on national defense and the Communist menace, became aware of the organizing
potential of these women's issues only slowly," but soon realized their value as organizing
tools. MANSBRIDGE, supra note 14, at 4-5.
24. See A. DWORKIN, NEW RIGHT WOMEN (1982); MANSBRIDGE, supra note 14, at
159; P. SCHLAFLY, THE POWER OF THE POSITIVE WOMAN (1977).
25. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Organized political opposition to abortion was precipitated
and energized by the Court's decision. See K. LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF
MOTHERHOOD ch. 6 (1984). The Catholic Church, which otherwise supports equality for
women, also provided substantial organizational and financial support to the anti-abortion
drive. See JAFFE, LINDHEIM AND LEE, ABORTION POLITICS ch. 13 (1981). Steiner analyzes
the impact of the Roe decision on the ERA ratification process in some detail, STEINER, supra
[Vol. 38:539
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Jane Mansbridge notes that these "women's" issues provided a val-
uable link with fundamentalist churches who proved to be powerful
actors in state legislatures, and with traditional homemakers who
had not previously been politically active.26 And as Mary Frances
Berry comments, "Although anti-ratificationists utilized sophisti-
cated direct mail techniques and were led by a very experienced
professional, Phyllis Schlafly, they managed to remain identified as
grassroots housewives and homemakers unmotivated by any broad
political purposes."27 The presence of women in the anti-ERA
ranks provided a convenient shield for male legislators to justify
their opposition to the ERA, and gave these women an influence
out of proportion to their numbers. Despite well-founded claims by
proponents that most women supported the ERA and that the ERA
would not change constitutional law about abortion, the opposition
was able to create the impression of the ERA as a battle among
women, and of a strong link between ERA and abortion.28
The considerable political and organizational strengths of this
coalition would have counted for little had the opponents been less
fortunate in the timing of the ratification campaign, which occurred
note 14, at 58-66, and 100-03, and concludes that the opposition's successful effort to link
abortion and the ERA in public and legislative consciousness was a major factor in the anti-
ratification groups' ability to defeat the Amendment. Mansbridge agrees. "Unable to over-
turn the Roe decision directly, many conservatives sought to turn the ERA into a referendum
on that decision. To a significant degree, they succeeded." MANSBRIDGE, supra note 14, at
13 (footnotes omitted).
26. MANSBRIDGE, supra note 14, at 5-6.
27. BERRY, supra note 14, at 84. The expanded coalition of anti-ERA activists
presented its members as a broad cross section of traditional homemakers opposed to femi-
nism and abortion. A more accurate characterization of most of those involved would be
female members of fundamentalist religions mobilized by the male religious hierarchy in con-
junction with right-wing political leadership to do grass roots lobbying. According to
STEINER, supra note 14, at 46-47, contrary to many post-mortems on the Amendment, fright-
ened traditional housewives, other than women from fundamentalist religious groups, were
not a major factor in the Amendment's defeat. Mansbridge reports at that in Illinois, STOP
ERA began to be effective in 1976 when it was able to expand its support base from highly
committed conservatives to traditional homemakers who were members of fundamentalist
churches. MANSBRIDGE, supra note 14, at 174-76. "Neither the media, the American public,
nor most legislators were aware that most of the women who demonstrated against the ERA
at state capitols around the country in the last years of the ERA struggle were fundamental-
ists brought there by their pastors." Id. at 175.
28. For the proposition that the ERA would not have any practical effect on Supreme
Court rulings about abortion, see The Impact of the Equal Rights Amendment, Hearings on
S, Res. 10 Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 98th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess., vol. 1, 451-454, summarized at 502 (1983) (testimony of
Ann Freedman) [hereinafter Impact Hearings, vol. 1], and Letter to Representative Don Ed-
wards, No. 7, 1983, id. at 624-25. This testimony and other evidence on the point is discussed
in MANSBRIDGE, supra note 14, at 127.
1988]
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during a general shift of political consciousness to the right.2 9 The
fact that Roe v. Wade 31 was decided during the same period, and
that the war in Afghanistan made the resumption of the draft ap-
pear a more realistic possibility, provided significant impetus to the
anti-ratification campaign.31 In addition, the unratified states were
far more conservative than those that had already ratified,32 and
included many legislators who had long been opposed to any in-
creases in the power of the federal courts or the Congress.3 3 Fi-
nally, other interests, who had much to lose economically if the
Amendment was ratified, particularly businesses who feared that
the ERA would lend support to the efforts of feminists and their
allies to make the workplace more hospitable to people with family
commitments, 34 were able effectively, if quietly, to encourage legis-
lators to take an anti-ERA position.35
29. On changes in the national political mood, see MANSBRIDGE, supra note 14, at 4-6;
Rhode, supra note 5, at 38. On the prominence of conservative and religious fundamentalist
organizations in the anti-ERA movement, see MANSBRIDGE, supra note 14, at 5-6; Rhode,
supra note 5, at 36-38.
30. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See also STEINER, supra note 14, at 58-66.
31. Mansbridge discusses the draft, MANSBRIDGE, supra note 14, at 85-86. See also
Rhode, supra note 5, at 49. But see M. KATZENSTEIN & C. MUELLER, THE WOMEN'S
MOVEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE, 220 (1987) (undue emphasis
on draft issue by some analysts of the ERA campaign).
32. BERRY, supra note 14, at 78. Though national poll results supported the ERA, "op-
position was still great among Republicans, people living in the Midwest and the South, and
among older Americans. Thus, additional ratifications needed to come from the states in
which support was identified as weakest." Id.
33. BERRY, supra note 14, at 66, 68; MANSBRIDGE, supra note 14, at 6, 163-64; Rhode,
supra note 5, at 50.
34. For example, through legislation requiring employers to provide parental and disa-
bility leave, and better salaries and benefits for both part-time and lower-paid workers and
their dependents. The large gap between the social welfare benefits provided by most indus-
trialized countries in Europe, through a combination of public programs and agreements
negotiated between organized labor and employers, and the social welfare benefits provided in
the United States, is striking. Employers in the United States are aware that other models
exist, and have been vigilant opponents of most efforts to expand government or employer
responsibility for the social welfare of employees and their families. While the ERA would
not directly require legislation imposing additional costs on private employers, the issues the
ERA would raise about the disparate impact of facially neutral policies on women would
contribute significantly to a more favorable climate for such initiatives.
35. Insurance companies may also have played a role in opposing ERA ratification in
key states, see, e.g., MANSBRIDGE, supra note 14, at 150-51, and their opposition has some-
times been attributed to a desire to retain gender-based rates, which have proven highly prof-
itable. See, e.g., MANSBRIDGE, supra note 14, at 41; STEINER, supra note 14, at 80. See also
BERRY, supra note 14, at 108, discussing the feminists' inability in 1984 to obtain passage of a
federal statute aimed at ending sex discrimination in insurance. There is no reason that insur-
ance companies could not make equally substantial profits with gender-neutral rates, how-
ever, so we are more inclined to believe that the insurance companies' undoubted role reflects
their general political conservatism and resistance both to governmental regulation and
[Vol. 38:539
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It is important to note the interaction among these factors. The
opponents' greater political sophistication and organizational
strength in unratified states coupled with the support of powerful
conservative political forces gave them credibility in key legislative
battles. In addition, because progress under the fourteenth amend-
ment and employment discrimination- law greatly reduced the ap-
parent urgency of the case for the Amendment, and because of the
volatility of the military and abortion issues, opponents were able to
portray the Amendment as either unnecessary or dangerous.
36
Since individual legislators were reluctant to take risks and the
Constitution required ratification by three-quarters of the states,
once the Amendment became controversial, its chances of being
passed were dramatically reduced.37
The thiee factors we have discussed are widely regarded as im-
portant by those who have attempted to understand the Amend-
ment's defeat.38 Nonetheless, our views differ with several of the
writers on this question whose work is best known. For instance, we
have quite different views than Jane Mansbridge,3 9 and Deborah
Rhode' about the extent to which the ERA's defeat was a conse-
quence of ambivalence about equal rights for women on the part of
members of the public, and particularly on the part of women in the
unratified states. Mansbridge not only argues that public support
for the Amendment was much weaker than proponents believed,
and indeed was waning during the latter half of the campaign, but
also contends that the proponents should have downplayed the sig-
nificance of the ERA's possible contribution to social change, and
change, as well as their interest, in common with most large corporations, in heading off
legislative initiatives of the kind we describe.
36. Whether because of the military draft, abortion or of the various other controversial
outcomes, such as homosexual marriage, opponents were able to persuade undecided legisla-
tors that one or more of these might flow from the Amendment despite proponents' denials.
See, ag., BERRY, supra note 14, at 68, 83-85; MANSBRIDGE, supra note 14, at 111, 112-14. It
seems likely that the military draft and abortion were in general the most significant of these
forces, as some of the other claimed outcomes (eg., unisex toilets) were as likely to under-
mine the ERA opponents' credibility as to persuade legislators. MANSBRIDGE, supra notel4,
at 114; STEINER, supra note 14, at 48-9, 58-66 (abortion as a factor), 68-74 (the military
draft).
37. BERRY, supra note 14, at 3, 69; MANSBRIDGE, supra note 14, at 19.
38. See supra notes 15-33 and accompanying text.
39. Mansbridge discusses the public's ambivalence about equality for women, MAN-
SBRIDGE, supra note 14, at 20-28.
40. Rhode argues that the public was deeply divided, "The source of opposition that
conservative leaders tapped was more deeply rooted than feminists generally acknowledged.
Anti-ERA sentiment was a reflection [in part] ... of fundamental ambivalence about the
meaning and value of formal equality in a context of societal inequality." Rhode, supra note
5, at 46-47.
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instead sought public support for the Amendment as a symbolic
gesture of equality with little practical significance, at least in the
near term.41 Our view, which is closer to that of Mary Frances
Berry,4" is that to the extent public concern about the Amendment's
effects was a factor in the outcome, it more often reflected misun-
derstanding of the Amendment's impact, and a general conservative
reaction toward change of any kind, rather than hostility to the ef-
fects the ERA would in fact have had.43 This is consistent with our
view, discussed above, that the powerful political forces aligned
against the Amendment in the unratified states, by and large, acted
not as representatives of the views of the majority of people, but
rather had their own reasons to oppose the Amendment, ranging
from interests in expanding the base of the radical right among
members of fundamentalist churches to businesses opposing addi-
tional moves toward gender equality in the workplace. Further-
more, we dissent most strenuously from the suggestion that the
ERA could have been ratified had its effects been downplayed in the
way Mansbridge suggests. Only if people believed that the ERA
would have positive effects-that the process of re-examination of
social structures that the Amendment promised would in fact im-
prove the lot of women and make the society more just- would
they be willing to embark on the experiment.
Moreover, while we agree with Mansbridge that people's ab-
stract commitment to equality is frequently more powerful than
their agreement with specific changes that equality might bring, we
do not agree that commitment to all the specifics is necessary for
the ERA to be adopted. Indeed, if women were able to mobilize in
Congress and in most state legislatures to obtain majority support
for all the specific changes that the ERA might bring, the counter-
majoritarian protection of the ERA would not be needed. In seek-
41. MANSBRIDGE, supra note 14, at 2, 4, 36, 56-59.
42. Berry's analysis is in some respects similar to that advanced by Rhode and Man-
sbridge, see, e.g., BERRY, supra note 14, at 83-85, but she suggests that the fears on which
opponents capitalized were largely about cultural shocks which were not in fact related to the
ERA, but had been made to seem so. Thus, she comments, "[These issues] were, in the sense
[the proponents] meant it, irrelevant to the principle of according to women equality of rights
in a democracy under the Constitution. But the antiratificationists had succeeded in drawing
attention away from the constitutional principle, to traditional family values and roles as the
turf on which the battle was fought." BERRY, supra note 14, at 85. See also the analysis
advanced by Steiner, who reviews many of the other explanations that have been advanced
for the ERA's defeat, and concludes that major emphasis should be placed on the impact of
the draft and the abortion issues on rendering the ERA too controversial to be adopted de-
spite fairly broad majority support for the Amendment. STEINER, supra note 14, at 50-51, 74.
43. Supra note 28. See also BERRY, supra note 14, at 85.
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ing to amend the Constitution, proponents sought supermajority
support for a relatively abstract principle of equal rights for women
that would later restrict that same majority when it sought to take
specific actions inconsistent with sexual equality. The success of
their case depended on maintaining public support for the ideal of
equality at a more general level, giving only enough examples to
show the fairness of women's claims. Had proponents been success-
ful in maintaining control of the terms of debate, they might well
have been able to translate the abstract support for equality Mans-
bridge cites into a victory for the Amendment. And to the extent
that proponents were drawn by the opposition into a series of very
specific debates about the Amendment's likely impact, they were at
a serious disadvantage.'
Another notable area of disagreement with both Mansbridge
and Rhode and to a lesser extent with Mary Frances Berry, con-
cerns their belief that, as a result of legal developments since the
Amendment was sent to the states for ratification in 1972, the ERA
would be primarily of symbolic value, because the legal changes it
would make would be minor.45 We disagree with this assessment.
The ERA would have had a profoundly important impact on laws
and policies that discriminate in fact, but not in words. Many of the
forms of state action that are most detrimental to women involve
laws and policies that are embedded in sexist stereotypes but ex-
pressed in gender neutral language. 6 When social as well as legal
norms make explicit sexism or racism unacceptable, white male
privilege can be preserved through other, slightly more subtle,
means. Referral networks that rely on personal relations with in-
44. The proponents in some instances are to be faulted, as Rhode claims, Rhode, supra
note 5, at 4, 22-23, in searching for the specifics that would sell the Amendment, rather than
recognizing that to a large extent the battle had to be won at a more abstract level. In the
main, however, the control of the debate shifted to proponents for the other reasons discussed
above, and not because of their own tactical and organizational failures. BERRY, supra note
14, at 85. Mansbridge and Steiner also discuss this problem. MANSBRIDGE, supra note 14, at
116-17; STEINER, supra note 14, at 49-74.
45. See BERRY, supra note 14, at ch. 8, and at 90-93. Mansbridge concludes that "[i]n
the short run" the ERA would reach only explicit sex based classifications and hence "would
have far less immediate impact on constitutional law than most of its advocates had assumed
back in 1972." MANSBRIDGE, supra note 14, at 55. Rhode asserts that the ERA had become
primarily symbolic, and that feminists will have to turn away from the ERA to "focus on
more concrete responses to structural inequities." Rhode, supra note 5, at 72.
46. Phyllis Segal provides detailed documentation of the ways in which facially neutral
laws and practice enforce and perpetuate destructive patterns of sexual inequality in relation
to federal social security benefits, pensions, employment, marriage and divorce, and welfare.
See Segal, Sexual Equality, the Equal Protection Clause, and the ERA, 33 BUFFALO L. REV.
85, 89-114 (1984).
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cumbents have the same effect as explicit discrimination. Physical
height or strength requirements, or expectations of long hours over
a period of years, will, as a practical matter, exclude most women
from jobs and public life. Most pervasively,
the old notion that a household was properly composed of a male
breadwinner and a female homemaker manifested itself in by-
gone days in rules that excluded married women from employ-
ment; today it manifests itself more subtly in rules providing
benefits to the "primary breadwinner" or head of household.
Like machine and tool specifications based on the dimension of
the average male body .... personnel policies that fail to take
account of child-bearing and child-rearing needs also reflect the
assumptions that only men, indeed only men in traditionally or-
ganized families, belong in the workplace.47
When the ERA was proposed in 1972, most courts and scholars
believed that the Constitution, as well as Title VII, prohibited state
policies and private employment practices that, in fact, discrimi-
nated against blacks, even if they were cast in seemingly neutral
terms.4 8 A central purpose of the ERA, as articulated by Emerson
and his young colleagues, was to extend to women the protection
from de facto discrimination that was then assumed applicable to
blacks.4 9
In 1976, a sharply divided Supreme Court pulled the rug out
from under the notion that the fourteenth amendment prohibited
state policies that were, in fact, injurious to black people. In Wash-
47. Taub & Williams, Will Equality Require More Than Assimilation, Accomodation or
Separation from the Existing Social Structure?, 37 RUTGERS L. REv. 825, 836 (1985).
48. In 1972, public education was the primary focus of fourteenth amendment equality
doctrine. Local school boards, under the scrutiny of federal district courts, were compelled
to take affirmative action to eliminate obstacles to desegregation "in a systematic and effective
manner," and "with all deliberate speed." Brown v. Board of Educ. II, 349 U.S. 294, 300-01
(1955). The Court reiterated this mandate in the face of "extreme public hostility" from the
citizens and elected public leadership of much of the South. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 12-
13 (1958). By 1964, the Court recognized that "[t]here has been all too much deliberation
and not enough speed" in enforcing the constitutional right to an integrated education. Grif-
fin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 229 (1964). In Swann v. Charlotte-Mechlenburg Bd.
of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971), for example, the Court observed that the history of segrega-
tion "warrants a presumption against schools that are substantially disproportionate in their
racial composition."
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 prohibited private employment practices that had particularly harsh impact on one
minority racial group, and that could not be justified by business necessity.
In 1972, many litigants and many lower federal courts believed that the fourteenth
amendment guarantee of equality required scrutiny of state policies that in fact had an ad-
verse impact upon blacks. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1970) (striking
municipal practice of providing minorities inferior public services).
49. See Brown et al, supra note 1, at 898-900.
[Vol. 38:539
WOMEN'S EQUALITY
ington v. Davis,5" the Court held that plaintiffs challenging facially
neutral government action as racially discriminatory under the
equal protection clause must establish both adverse impact and dis-
criminatory purpose in order to trigger the strict scrutiny accorded
race-discrimination claims.51
In 1979, the standard of proof for women alleging de facto dis-
crimination was made even more stringent. The Court articulated a
standard of proof for de facto sex discrimination that requires wo-
men to show that the harmful state policy was adopted "at least in
part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon"
women.
5 2
Powerful concerns underlie the Court's reluctance to adopt a
broad rule condemning any state policy that has a disparately harsh
impact upon women or blacks. Constitutional standards must be
judicially manageable, linked to the practical limits of judicial
power and sensitive to the need to separate judicial from legislative
and administrative functions. Nonetheless, scholarly response to
the Supreme Court's rigid standards of proof in disparate impact
cases has been highly critical.5" Many have argued persuasively
that the Court adopted too narrow a view of the constitutional re-
quirements for both the plaintiffs' burden of proof and the defend-
ants' burden of justification in disparate impact cases. With respect
to the burden that a plaintiff must meet to establish discrimination,
the Court assumed that only two choices were available to it: to
hold that disparate impact alone establishes discrimination or to re-
quire a smoking gun of illicit intent. Similarly, with respect to the
defendants' burden of justification, the Court has assumed that if
50. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
51. However, the requisite discriminatory purpose can "be inferred from the totality of
the relevant facts," including the fact of discriminatory impact. Id. at 241-42. In subsequent
race-discrimination cases, this requirement was satisfied by such objective factors as the fore-
seeable consequences of an ostensibly neutral policy, Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443
U.S. 449, 464-65 (1979), and the presence of subjective decision making. Castaneda v. Par-
tida, 430 U.S. 482, 493-97 (1977).
52. Personnel Admin. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). This standard was applied
to a racial disparate impact claim in McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1759 (1987).
53. See, eg., Brest, The Supreme Court 1975 Term-Forward: In Defense of the Antidis-
crimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976); Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and
Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36 (1977); Perry,
The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1977);
Segal, supra note 46, at 118-30; Soifer, Complacency and Constitutional Law, 42 OHIO ST. L.
J. 383 (1981); Weinzweig, Discriminatory Impact and Intent Under the Equal Protection
Clause: The Supreme Court and the Mind-Body Problem, I L. & INEQUALITY, 277 (1983);
Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Disproportionate Impact: An Assesment After Feeney, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 1376 (1979).
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the plaintiff proved a prima facie case of discrimination, the chal-
lenged policy could only be justified by the kind of strong showing
demanded to support laws incorporating an explicit racial or sexual
classification. In the past decade, scholars have richly articulated a
number of alternative ways in which the Court might take a more
active role in redressing state policies that are neutral in form but
discriminatory in fact, while at the same time remaining sensitive to
legitimate needs for judicially manageable standards and legislative
flexibility.
The 1970's developments eviscerating the fourteenth amend-
ment racial equality jurisprudence in disparate impact cases made it
very difficult for the proponents of the ERA to explain that it would
demand careful scrutiny of state policies that are neutral in form
but sexual discriminatory in fact. That difficulty stems in part be-
cause this branch of equality doctrine demands a complex balancing
of legitimate claims for equal treatment against legitimate concerns
about the practical limits of judicial power that is difficult to com-
municate in the slogans of a ratification campaign. But, in addition,
the ERA faced political difficulty. Its proponents had no desire to
urge that women were entitled to a greater measure of constitu-
tional protection than black people. Rather, most ERA proponents
sought common cause between those who struggled against racism
and sexism. Many ERA proponents believed that as a practical
matter, the ERA's stronger protection against laws that were sexist
in impact would have a spillover effect extending stronger protec-
tion to blacks injured by laws that were racist in impact. But it was
difficult to use the actual words of the ERA to support this prag-
matic belief.54
Thus, in sum, we do not believe that the defeat of the ERA re-
flects a broad rejection of Thomas Emerson's vision that men and
women must be treated as equals under the Constitution. Rather,
the ERA proponents were victims of their own success in that the
program and principles articulated by Emerson were largely incor-
porated into the fourteenth amendment to eradicate many of the
most blatant forms of discrimination in the courts and in the legisla-
tures. Further, ERA proponents made many damaging tactical er-
rors, while its opponents benefited from a coalition with other
powerful interest groups and large shifts to the right in the general
54. In the 1983 Senate hearings on the ERA, proponents articulated a nuanced dispa-
rate treatment standard that would provide a more vigorous protection for both women and
blacks. See Impact Hearings, vol. 1, supra note 27, at 539 (testimony of Ann Freedman); Id.
at 770 (testimony of Phyllis N. Segal on the impact of the ERA on veteran's programs).
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political climate. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, when the
Amendment was considered by the final, most traditional states
necessary to ratification, a core open issue was the complex one of
the impact of the Amendment on de facto discrimination. That so-
phisticated issue was not easily communicated or debated in the
simplifying terms of the constitutional amendment process.
III. THE MEANING OF THE BORK REJECTION
FOR SEX EQUALITY
In 1987 the United States Senate rejected President Reagan's
nomination of Judge Robert Bork as Associate Justice of the United
States Supreme Court, by the widest margin in history. That act
was an extraordinary political and constitutional event in American
history. Few Supreme Court nominees have been rejected, even
when the Senate was controlled by a party opposed to the Presi-
dent's. In this century, the Senate has consistently operated on the
assumption that a President may name Justices to suit his or her
constitutional views, and that the Senate may properly reject that
choice only if it is dissatisfied with the nominee's personal integrity
or competence.55 No evidence was offered against Judge Bork's in-
tellectual capacity or personal character.
To think about the constitutional meaning of the Senate's rejec-
tion of Judge Bork, we must consider, first, the complex factual
question of why the Senate refused to confirm him, and, second, the
even more difficult question of the significance of this action for
constitutional interpretation.
Obviously many factors may have contributed to the defeat of
Judge Bork's nomination.56 The nomination was 6pposed by a mu-
55. The Senate rejected Richard Nixon's nominations of Clement F. Haynsworth and
G. Harold Carswell, and Lyndon Johnson's promotion of Justice Abe Fortas to the position
of Chief Justice. But in each case there were substantial grounds to question the candidates
ethical or intellectual qualifications. The 33 Democrats who voted against Reagan's promo-
tion of William Rehnquist to Chief Justice justified those votes on grounds of character. See
R. Dworkin, From Bork to Kennedy, N.Y. Rev. Books, Dec. 17, 1987, 36 [hereinafter From
Bork to Kennedy].
56. Extensive media coverage of the confirmation probably hurt Bork. Floyd Abrams, a
leading lawyer who represents the New York Times, observed that this extensive coverage
was largely fortuitus and could easily have been preempted by other major news, e.g. the Gulf
war or stock market crash that occurred a few weeks later. Talk to the National Coalition
Against Censorship, Dec. 18, 1987. The celebrations surrounding the bicentennial of the
Constitution may have created an aura of grandeur about the Constitution that contrasted
sharply with Bork's crabbed interpretations of constitutional rights and liberties. Alabama's
Senator Heflin, a key swing vote on the Senate Judiciary Committee, may have been influ-
enced by local headlines denouncing Bork as an atheist, as well as by the nominee's positions
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tually supportive alliance of: 1) black voters who, as a result of the
civil rights movement and the Voting Rights Act, hold the balance
of political power in the South and made opposition to Judge Bork
essential to their electorial support; 2) elite establishment liberals
who feared the results of Judge Bork's dogmatic rhetoric;57 and 3)
women, excluded from the community of constitutional protection
by Judge Bork's originalist view of the Constitution.
The nomination of Robert Bork was seen as a serious threat to
several of the constitutional issues to which Thomas Emerson con-
tributed so much, including racial equality and the developing pro-
tection of sexual equality and sexual liberty. The jurisprudence of
original intent advocated by Edwin Meese and Robert Bork is of
particular concern to women because it is relatively plain that
neither the drafters of the original Constitution, nor the drafters of
the fourteenth amendment regarded women as full citizens.58 For
over fifteen years Judge Bork had forcefully asserted that the consti-
tutional guarantee of equality prohibits only certain limited forms
of racial discrimination and very few other forms of dis-
crimination.5 9
As we have already discussed, the past fifteen years have been
years of great national debate about the meaning of gender equality.
As a colleague of Emerson's at Yale, Bork taught constitutional
law, in a seminar setting, for more than a decade. Through this
on issues. A nominee who weighed thirty pounds less and was clean shaven would have
projected a more positive television image.
57. Many prestigious organizations, such as the American Civil Liberties' Union and
the Bar Association of the City of New York, which do not ordinarily take positions opposing
Supreme Court nominees, protested the Bork nomination. Forty percent of the faculty mem-
bers of all accredited law schools in the U.S. signed petitions calling on the Senate to reject
him. From Bork to Kennedy, supra note 55, at 38.
58. See Law, The Founders on Families, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 583 (1987); Nichols, Wal-
lowing in Intention, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 613 (1987).
59. "The equal protection clause.., can require formal procedural equality, and, be-
cause of its historical origins, it does require that government not discriminate along racial
lines. But much more than that cannot properly be read into the clause." Bork, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 147 IND. L.J. 1, 11 (1971). In 1984, as a
judge, he wrote that "[t]he Constitution has provisions that create specific rights. These pro-
tect, among others, racial, ethnic, and religious minorities." Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d
1388, 1397 (D.C. Cir 1984). Women are conspicuously absent from this list. As recently as
June 10, 1987 he stated, "I do think that the equal protection clause probably should have
been kept to things like race and ethnicity. When the Supreme Court decided that having
different drinking ages for young men and young women violated the equal protection clause,
I thought that was a very-that was not to trivialize the Constitution and to spread it to areas




period he talked and wrote prolifically about the Constitution, in
speeches and popular articles.
In his confirmation testimony Judge Bork took positions on sex-
ual equality and reproductive privacy that were flatly at odds with
the positions that he had so frequently and forcefully taken in the
recent and distant past. For many years he denounced the Supreme
Court decisions protecting a woman's right to choose abortion as
"unconstitutional" and "a wholly unjustifiable judicial usurpation
of state legislative authority."6 In the confirmation hearings he tes-
tified that he had only meant to criticize the reasoning adopted by
the Supreme Court and did not necessarily believe that the cases
reached the wrong results. Judge Bork's denunciation of Supreme
Court protection for core human liberties, such as reproductive
freedom, without first considering whether these freedoms might be
constitutionally protected on other grounds, suggests he lacked se-
rious concern for civil rights.
While Thomas Emerson always understood that the ideas and
work of legal academics can have real impact in the world, Judge
Bork sought to characterize his extreme statements as academic
speculation, causing no concrete injury to real people. Further, that
characterization was belied by his actions as a federal court judge
rejecting citizens' constitutional, claims premised on the very pri-
vacy and liberty rights the Supreme Court has recognized.6'
In relation to sex equality Judge Bork stated, for the first time at
his confirmation hearings, that he accepted that equal protection
prohibits "unreasonable" sex-based discrimination.62 But many
60. The Human Life Bill: Hearings on S. 158 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of
Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 310 (1982).
61. In Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, addendum to the opinion for the Court, 712
F.2d 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Tamm, J., Edwards, J., Bork, J., concurring and dissenting),
Judge Bork dissented from a decision protecting a father's right to a fair process to determine
whether the needs of the government's Witness Protection Program demanded termination of
his relation with his children. Judge Bork expressed a barely concealed contempt for the fact
that the Supreme Court had afforded any constitutional protection against thoughtless, inept
or malicious government action shattering a parent-child relationship.
In Dronenberg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984) he rejected a claim that the
constitutional right to liberty and privacy prevents the government from firing a person solely
because he engaged in voluntary, consensual homosexual conduct. Judge Bork refused to
address the similarities and differences between the case before him and numerous other cases
in which the Supreme Court had recognized a constitutional right to privacy. Rather, he
simply asserted that the Supreme Court had provided "no explanatory principle that informs
a lower court how to reason about what is and what is not encompassed by the right of
privacy." 741 F.2d at 1395.
62. He said, if confirmed, he would evaluate sex based classifications under a "reason-
able basis approach that rejects artificial distinctions and discrimination," and strike down
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Senators on the Judiciary Committee understood that for most of
this century the Supreme Court had applied the "reasonable basis"
standard to uphold discriminatory laws that are now, thanks in
large part to Emerson's work, understood as blatantly sexist.6 3
Judge Bork's "new" vision of equality was utterly unpersuasive, un-
clear, and either toothless or flatly inconsistent with his long stand-
ing views, reiterated in his testimony before the Committee.'
Judge Bork and his supporters sought to characterize his views
as similar to those of Justice Stevens, who has sought to articulate a
more flexible approach to equality jurisprudence.65 At the heart of
Steven's equality analysis is an affirmative, substantive social vision
that explores the reality of historic oppression and seeks to include
disadvantaged groups in the activities and institutions of the major-
ity.66 Judge Bork's "new" equality was emphatically not that of
Justice Steven's.
67
historic discriminations that "no longer seem to anybody to be reasonable." Testimony, Sep-
tember 17, 1987, as reported in the N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1987, at B14, col. 4.
63. For example, as recently as 1961, in Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), a unani-
mous Court approved a Florida law excluding women from the civic obligation to serve on
juries. Gwendolyn Hoyt killed her husband in the white heat of a domestic dispute. She
pleaded temporary insanity. An all male jury rejected her claim. She appealed to the
Supreme Court, arguing that excluding women from the jury discriminated on the basis of
sex and denied her a jury of her peers. The Court, applying the "reasonable basis" approach,
upheld the exclusion. The Court reasoned that because a "woman is still regarded as the
center of home and family life," it is reasonable to relieve all women-whatever their situa-
tion-from the civic obligation of jury service." Id. at 62.
64. Did he mean simply to apply the deferential "rational basis" standard that justified
exclusion of women from juries, public life, and responsible work? If that is all he meant, he
had not conceded an inch. Or, did he rather accept the Supreme Court's jurisprudence re-
quiring careful scrutiny of laws that hurt vulnerable people or burden fundamental liberties?
Or, did he mean that the Supreme Court should be aggressive in reviewing the rationality of
all legislative classifications, whether they enforce gender difference or traffic safety?
65. Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens, have expressed dissatisfaction with a method
of constitutional analysis under which the outcome depends solely on whether a particular
group can be characterized as constitutionally vulnerable. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976) (Stevens, J., concurring); Cleburne v. Cleburne Center for Independent Living, 473
U.S. 432, 455 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
66. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 313 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Marshall, A Comment on the Nondiscrimination Principle in a "Nation of Minorities," 93
YALE L.J. 1006, 1011 (1984). See also Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 501
(1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a general discussion see, Note, Justice Stevens' Equal
Protection Jurisprudence, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1146 (1987).
67. Justice Stevens insists that the Constitution must provide special scrutiny to laws
that hurt "a traditionally disfavored class." ("However irrational it may be to burden inno-
cent children because their parents did not marry, illegitimates are nonetheless a traditionally
disfavored class in our society. Because of that tradition of disfavor, the Court should be
especially vigilant in examining any classification which involves illegitimacy." Mathews v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 520 (1976)). Judge Bork rejects the notion that the Constitution re-
quires special equality scrutiny for particular groups. "Let me say something about why I
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The Senators who voted against Judge Bork perceived his gen-
eral theory of original intent, and his specific positions on issues of
special concern to women, as far outside the mainstream of current
understanding about the meaning of the Constitution.68
prefer a reasonable basis analysis to a group-by-group analysis. It is not just that the lan-
guage of the amendment refers to any person, therefore all persons. It is that if one thing is
clear about the the [fjourteenth [a]mendment, it is that if the Framers of that [a]mendment,
the people who ratified it, had no intention of wiping out distinctions between men and wo-
men that we would now regard as very discriminatory." Hearings on the Confirmation of
Judge Robert Bork to the United States Supreme Court Before the Senate Judiciary Comm.,
100th Cong., 2d Sess., Sept. 17, 1987, at 33 [hereinafter Bork Confirmation Hearings].
Judge Bork would uphold sexually discriminatory laws that rested on statistical general-
izations, such as physical strength, that did not describe individual difference. "[R]ational
distinctions cannot be made between men and women, usually except on physical strength or
something of that sort, which is the combat example." Bork Confirmation Hearings, supra, at
35. Justice Stevens would require that if an individual woman is strong enough to do a job,
she should be allowed to do it.
Judge Bork perceives laws premised upon sex based stereotypes as "trivial." See discus-
sion of Craig v. Boren, Bork Confirmation Hearings, supra, at 134-36. Justice Stevens, by
contrast, understands that stereotyped reactions often have no rational relationship--other
than pure prejudicial discrimination-to the stated purpose for which the classification is
being made, and such classifications are likely to be the result of "habit, rather than analysis."
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 520 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Michael M. v. Superior
Court, 450 U.S. 467, 501 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Most fundamentally, Judge Bork perceives constitutional equality as limited by the em-
pirical reality of equal behavior and a social consensus that supports it. "There was a time in
this country when the distinction made in Frontiero, that is, we will assume that a woman is a
dependent and a man is not, might have made some sense. That was a time when women
were not in the marketplace. So that they would have to prove that they were in the market-
place." Bork Confirmation Hearings, supra at 142. Justice Stevens understands the vital
leadership role that the Court must play in integrating excluded and vulnerable groups in to
the mainstream of American society. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 313
(1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
68. For example, Senator Howell Heflin, a conservative Democrat from Alabama and
former Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court, explained "I think a lifetime appoint-
ment on the Supreme Court is too important to trust to one that you have serious questions
about concerning his extremism." S. Roberts, 9-5 Panel Vote Against Bork Sends Nomination
to Senate Amid Predictions of Defeat, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1987, at 1, col. 6. Senator Decon-
cini, a conservative Democrat from Arizona said that Reagan had "selected someone that,
indeed, is outside the mainstream of conservatism in this country. He selected him, I think,
knowing that he was outside the mainstream, and he attempted, through the White House to
sell this person for something that he was not." Id. at B10, col. 1.
An analysis by Linda Greenhouse summarized:
The issue that jelled for the opposition, surprisingly, was privacy. The number of
senators who gave prominince to the privacy issue in their speeches opposing Judge
Bork was striking. Indeed, the privacy issue underwent a fascinating transforma-
tion during the course of this confirmation debate. Before the confirmation hear-
ings began, the word "privacy" in political discourse was widely understood as a
metaphor for abortion, a politically dangerous topic. During the hearings, privacy
became another metaphor entirely. It came to stand for the whole theme of funda-
mental rights, the concept of an expansive Constitution in contrast to Judge Bork's
view that the Constitution was limited by its precise language and the intent of its
18th century framers.
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What then should the Senate rejection of Judge Bork mean for
future interpretation of the Constitution? At a minimum the Sen-
ate, and the American people, rejected the crude originalist juris-
prudence of Reagan and Meese, which Judge Bork was nominated
to embody and defend. Further, it seems to us that Professor Ron-
ald Dworkin is correct in seeing an even broader meaning in the
Bork rejection:
[M]any of the positions he justified by appealing to original in-
tention - that the Equal Protection Clause specially condemns
only racial discrimination, for example, and that the Constitu-
tion, in spite of what the Supreme Court has said, contains no
general right of privacy - were so thoroughly discredited in the
hearings, and proved so generally unpopular, that I doubt that
they will any longer be advanced even by lawyers and judges who
found them congenial before. That, in itself, may significantly
affect the course of constitutional law. The standard of "original
intention," as a strict and exclusive limit on the grounds of legiti-
mate Supreme Court decisions, is probably dead.69
Beyond the likely death of "original intent" as a legitimate inter-
pretive tool, it is possible to tell diametrically different stories about
the meaning of the Bork rejection. One story denies that the Sen-
ate's action has any impact beyond the rejection of crude original
intent. The second story, which we prefer, sees the Senate's action
as encouraging the Supreme Court to continue its constitutional
voyage toward extending liberty and equality to all people.
The first story, the limited view, argues that the rejection of
Judge Bork means only that the Constitution protects women from
egregiously sexist and deeply unpopular forms of oppression. The
most powerful pieces of evidence for a limited reading of the signifi-
cance of the Bork rejection are: 1) the easy confirmation of Presi-
dent Reagan's nomination of Judge Anthony Kennedy, and 2) the
rejection of the ERA.
On January 27, 1988 the Senate Judiciary Committee unani-
mously approved President Reagan's nomination of Judge Anthony
M. Kennedy as Associate Justice of the United States Supreme
Court.7° Judge Kennedy's judicial style and philosophy contrast
sharply with Judge Bork's. The language of Judge Kennedy's deci-
sions are lawyerly and precise, completely unlike the political rheto-
What Went Wrong: Reagan's Popularity Was Not Enough to End Fears of Shift on Social
Issues, Id. at B10.
69. From Bork to Kennedy, supra note 55, at 36, 40.




ic of Judge Bork. Although both men taught constitutional law
and spoke frequently at legal gatherings, Judge Bork chose to ad-
dress controversial themes in the most provocative terms, while
Judge Kennedy tended to offer modulated remarks on more mun-
dane subjects.
On issues of sexual privacy, the style of the two judges' views
contrast sharply. Judge Kennedy never broadly challenged the le-
gitimacy of the Supreme Court privacy doctrine that Judge Bork
has so dramatically condemned.7" Each judge has evaluated consti-
tutional privacy claims asserted by servicemen discharged for en-
gaging in private, consensual homosexual activity. Judge Bork
refused to consider whether the constitutional right to privacy pro-
tected the litigant before him, asserting that the Supreme Court's
cases provide, "no explanatory principle that informs a lower court
how to reason about what is and what is not encompassed by the
right of privacy."72 Judge Kennedy, by contrast, declined to decide
the broad question whether the Constitution sometimes prohibits
the state from punishing consensual private homosexual conduct
between adults, by protecting such conduct as a "fundamental
right."73 Rather, Judge Kennedy confined his holding narrowly to
the special facts before him.74
71. In a thoughtful address on unenumerated constitutional rights, he observed the ten-
sion between the Supreme Court decision recognizing that the Constitution protects married
peoples right to use contraceptives and the more recent Supreme Court case refusing to ex-
tend constitutional protection to people of the same sex who were prosecuted for private,
consensual sexual activity. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Bowers v.
Hardwick, 106 S.Ct. 2841 (1986). A. Kennedy, "Unenumerated Rights and the Dictates of
Judicial Restraint," Speech to the Canadian Institute for Advanced Legal Studies, The Stan-
ford Lectures, Palo Alto, California, July 24-August 1, 1986, at 10-12. He further observes
that a key issue in both cases involves the power of the majority to enforce moral views on
private consensual behavior that does not injure third parties. Id. at 9-10. But, having thus
identified major themes and tensions posed by the cases, Judge Kennedy avoided any grand
pronouncements or denunciations. Kennedy takes a disturbing narrow view of the function
of federal judges in protecting constitutional liberty. "One can conclude that certain essen-
tial, or fundamental, rights should exist in any just society. It does not follow that each of
those essential rights is one that we as judges can enforce under the written Constitution. The
Due Process Clause is not a guarantee of every right that should inhere in an ideal system."
Id. at 13.
72. Dronunberg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
73. "[We can concede arguendo that the reasons which led the Court to protect certain
private decisions intimately linked with one's personality, see, e.g., Roe [v. Wade] ... and
family living arrangements beyond the core nuclear family, see, eg., Zabloki[V. Redhail]...
suggest that some kinds of government regulation of private consensual homosexual behavior
may face substantial constitutional challenge." Beller v. Meddendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 810 (9th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981).
74. He stated that "[t]he nature of the employer- the Navy-is crucial to our deci-
sion.... [T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly held that constitutional rights must be viewed
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Judge Kennedy, unlike Judge Bork, never expressed doubt that
the fourteenth amendment applies to gender discrimination.
Rather, in the two constitutional sexual equality cases that Ken-
nedy decided as a circuit court judge, he recited Supreme Court
precedent that sex-based classifications may be upheld only if
closely related to important governmental interests.75 Further,
Judge Kennedy affirms the need for openness to evolving under-
standing and protection of gender equality.76
Nonetheless, in both privacy and sex-equality cases the bottom
line-the result-is often the same with both Judges. Judge Ken-
nedy rejects sexual privacy claims and upholds gender classifica-
tions. His sexual equality cases did not persuasively explain why
the gender classification is closely related to important state inter-
ests.77 Perhaps even more disturbing, Judge Kennedy's approach to
sexual discrimination claims under Title VII seems to require both
explicit evidence of discrimination, and evidence of hostility to-
wards women.78 Obviously an equality standard that bars only sex-
in light of the special circumstances and needs of the armed forces." Id. Dissenting from the
Ninth Circuit's subsequent rejection of the suggestion for rehearing en banc, Judge Norris
took issue with Kennedy's uncritical acceptance of the government's military necessity justifi-
cation, noting that, "[c]onsidered with proper detachment rather than knee-jerk acquies-
cence, the military necessity argument is revealed not to be supported by the record." Miller
v. Rumsfeld, 647 F.2d 80, 87 (1981).
75. In United States v. Reiser, 532 F.2d 673 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 838 (1976),
Kennedy joined a per curiam decision upholding male-only registration for the draft. In
United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 988 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 852 (1978), Judge
Kennedy upheld a conviction of a man charged with forcible sodomy under a statute provid-
ing greater penalties for sexual assault on a man than for sexual assault on a woman. In
dicta, he implied that a "fair and substantial relation to an important governmental interest"
would be an appropriate standard.
76. In his confirmation hearings Judge Kennedy noted that the judicial system has not
had "the historical experience with gender discrimination." He said, "[T]he law there really
seems to me in a state of evolution at this point, and it is going to take more cases for us to
ascertain whether or not the heightened scrutiny standard is sufficient to protect the rights of
women, or whether or not the strict standard should be adopted." Hearings on the Confirma-
tion of Judge Anthony M. Kennedy to the United States Supreme Court Before the Senate
Judiciary Comm., 100th Cong., 2d Sess., at 170 (Dec. 14, 1987) [hereinafter Kennedy Confir-
mation Hearings].
77. In Smith, 574 F.2d at 991, Judge Kennedy looked to "traditions and community
attitudes that have prevailed for centuries," to uphold the sex based classification. Of course
many "traditions and community attitudes" that seemed natural and reasonable only 20
years ago are now understood as sexist.
78. In AFSCME v. State of Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985), a Title VII
action in which a class of women employees of the state of Washington claimed that they
were discriminated against on the basis of sex in setting of lower wages for job classifications
held predominantly by women, the lower court held for the plaintiffs on both a disparate
impact and disparate treatment theory. Judge Kennedy reversed saying that disparate impact
gives rise to a prima facie violation of Title VII only "where a practice is specific and focused
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ist policies, that are explicitly hostile toward women provides them
little protection under the law.
In sum, one lesson that could be drawn from the rejection of
Judge Bork and the ERA, and the easy confirmation of Judge Ken-
nedy, is that the Senate and the American people support judicial
action striking down those laws that are blatantly sexist and hostile
to women, as well as those state intrusions on sexual and reproduc-
tive privacy that are deeply unpopular and sustained only by a vo-
ciferous minority - but no more. Americans like to believe that
the Constitution protects grand ideals of liberty and equality, but do
not necessarily want these ideals to be vigorously enforced. Thus,
one could conclude that Americans prefer a Constitution that ob-
scures, rather than remedies, the reality of sexual and racial bias
and oppression. Not only did Judge Bork's stark articulations not
permit enforcement of equality and liberty, they also denied the
grand rhetorical vision that our Constitution is fundamentally just
and inclusive. 0
A second, more generous view of the Bork rejection sees it as
broadly endorsing a process of constitutional elaboration under
which visions of liberty and equality expand in response to a grow-
ing ability to hear the voices of the excluded and to understand the
social mechanisms of oppression. It is an affirmation of the process
that the Supreme Court has undertaken to include women within
the body politic through expansion of constitutional rights of lib-
erty, privacy and equality. Although the Senate did not approve
any particular Supreme Court holding,79 it ratified a more general
process of reasoned elaboration and expansion of constitutional pro-
tection through the Bork vote.
[so] we can address whether it is a pretext for discrimination." AFSCME, 770 F.2d at 1405.
The search for "pretext" misapprehends the meaning of Title VII, which prohibits employ-
ment practices that operate to exclude blacks or women even where no hostile animus exists.
See Statement of Susan Deller Ross, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center
on Behalf of the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund on the Nomination of Judge
Anthony M. Kennedy to the Supreme Court of the United States 15 (Dec. 15, 1987) (State-
ment before the Senate Judiciary Committee). Similarly, in explaining his membership in
clubs that explicitly excluded women, Judge Kennedy argued that the club policies were not
"invidious discrimination" because they were not the result of "ill-will" and did not "intend
to impose a stigma on such persons. Kennedy Confirmation Hearings, supra note 76, at 50
(response of Judge Kennedy to Senate Judiciary Questionnaire).
79. Indeed, many of the Supreme Court's most important sexual equality decisions
struck down acts of Congress. See, eg., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (hold-
ing unconstitutional a federal law allowing a male member of the uniformed services to claim
his spouse as a dependent automatically while permitting the same deduction to a female
member of the uniformed services only upon a showing that her spouse was in fact depen-
dent on her).
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That vote can be seen as the culmination of a process of struc-
tural amendment of the Constitution that has gone on for the past
two decades as the Supreme Court, the political branches, and the
American people have participated in a profound process of trans-
formation, to bring women within the community of constitutional
protection and concern. Professor Bruce Ackerman has argued
powerfully that the process of constitutional transformation is not
limited solely to the formal process of constitutional amendment.80
He examines the Supreme Court decisions of 1937 that affirmed the
broad regulatory power of the modem welfare state and that re-
jected those constitutional decisions that have come to be epito-
mized by the Lochner case. It is misleading, he argues, to
characterize the Supreme Court's early twentieth century decisions
protecting the economic status quo as simply a constitutional "mis-
take."81 Rather, he urges that we see the rejection of Lochner as a
"process of constitutional creation.""2 The Court's acceptance of
thfe regulatory authority of the modem welfare state was "the final
point in the process of structural amendment. It is the moment at
which the judges recognized that a new constitutional principle had
indeed been ratified by the People, and that the time had come for
the serious work of judicial interpretation and implementation to
begin."8 3
As we have briefly suggested, the technical jurisprudential tools
exist to shift the direction of fourteenth amendment sexual (and
race) equality standards to provide greater protection against state
policies that reflect and enforce bias through laws cast in neutral
80. Ackerman, The Storrs Lecutres: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013
(1984).
81. [T]he stories we tell ourselves to build up the constitutional significance of the
first two peaks-surrounding the Founding and the Civil War Amendments-differ
dramatically from the story we tell to remind ourselves of the constitutional vindi-
cation of the activist welfare state. When we look back upon the first two great
constitutional solutions, we tell a tale of constitutional creation.... In contrast, we
interpret the rise of the activist state with a different framework. Here we tell our-
selves a myth of rediscovery rather than a tale of constitutional creation .... The
half century between 1880 and 1930 can then be viewed as a (complex) story about
the fall from grace- wherein some of the Justices (not Holmes of course) sinfully
strayed from the path of righteousness and imposed their antidemocratic laissez-
faire philosophy upon We the People of the United States.
Id. at 1052.
82, Id. at 1055.
83. Id. at 1056. The constitutional transformation that authorized the modem welfare
state posed a funamentally different political issue than the more recent constitutional trans-
formation in relation to gender equality and sexual liberty. In the 1930's the Court author-
ized majorities to enact legislation to implement community welfare, while the current
constitutional transformation protects individuals against majoritarian bias and intrusion.
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form. Careful analysis of constitutional text, history, decisions and
traditions, as well as the larger moral and political values in which
the Constitution is rooted, present a powerful case for the wisdom
and justice of such a move. That intellectual ground work is a nec-
essary underpinning for constitutional change.
The lesson of Thomas I. Emerson's work for sexual equality
suggests that while coherent intellectual and constitutional theory
may be necessary for change, it is not alone sufficient. The enor-
mous shifts in constitutional doctrine on sex equality of recent years
have occurred in response to popular understanding and pressure
for change, as well as in response to theoretical arguments. The
defeat of Judge Bork supports further change in the direction of
expanded constitutional protection for equality and liberty. The
work of Emerson and others provides the intellectual and concep-
tual framework in which that change could take place. Whether it
happens or not depends upon broader, more popular, understand-
ing and struggles. That is not, of course, to say, that the Supreme
Court simply interprets the Constitution to reflect popular will.
Particularly in securing equality and protecting individual liberty
the Court's role has often been, and should be, one of leadership.
The defeat of Judge Bork suggests that the time may now be ripe for
the exercise of that leadership.
